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COLIN MCGINN. "EVOLUTION. ANIMALS. AND THE
BASIS OF MORALITY". INQUIRY 22 (1979). PP.
81-99.
Colin McGinn aruges that "[wlhat makes
morality possible--namely, the cognitive
character of moral reasons--involves no
restriction of its scope, either to the
family or to the group or to the species."
(p. 98) He begins by exposing an ubiquitous
misunderstanding of evolutionary theory;
he argues that genes, rather than groups,
are the units of natural selection. McGinn
then poses the following question: If the
mainspring of morality is sentiment that
develops in accordance with the principles
of natural selection, how can the upsurge
and continuance of altruism that is inde
pendent of kin relations be explained? He
argues that such altruism, and hence
"genuine morality", can only be explained
by rejecting the view that morality is
founded on sentiment in favor of the view
that morality is founded of' reason. Altru
ism that is independent of ~:in relations
persists because it is part and parcel of
rationality, and rationality is to the
advantage of an organism's genes. In
NcGinn's words, "[m]orality, which jibs
at the ruthless ways of natural selection,
is the price the genes pay for intelligent
survival machines." (p. 93) This implies
that there cannot be creatures who are both
rational and amoral. The fiial step in
McGinn's argument is that si.ce morality
is founded on reason, and since reason
requires the ~ecognition of the reality
of other beings and their interests,
"morality recommends the extension of
human concern beyond the bounds of our
own species." (p. 98)
One could respond to this argument in
a number of ways. One could quarrel with
HcGinn's distinction between sentiment
and reason, or his distinction between cog
nitivism and non-cognitivism, or deny that
reason requires as much as McGinn believes.
I will sketch two different lines of
attack that one might explore.
i~hen t1cGinn argueS that "cognitivism"
is the only explanation of the upsurge and
continuance of altruism that is independent
of kin relations, he assumes that such
altruism is not in the interests of the
altruist's genes. Yet recent work by
Robert Trivers and John Maynard Smith has
~een directed towards showing that some kin
~ndependent altruism is in the interests of
the altruist's genes. (See, for example,
the article by Smith in the September, 1978
issue of Scientific American.) If Smith
and.Trivers are r~ght, morality may be ex
pla~nable by sent~ment developed in accor
dance with natural selection after all. .
Alternatively, one could argue that ~orality
is not directly linked to biology. One of
the central differences between humans and
most other animals is the relative openness
of our programs. It is this relative open
ness that permits the development of social
practices that are not directly genetically
determined. Morality, to put the point
crudely, might well be a matter of "con
venti(:m". rather than a matter of biology.
If th~s ~s so, then there will be no
explanation of morality forthcoming in the
terms that McGinn envisions.
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McGinn's argument is quite ingenious.
I have btp.n unable to do it justice in
this shor~ review. It is worthy of care
careful attention from all those concerned
with the foundations of morality or the
moral status of animals.
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